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Social Conﬂict Theory and White-collar Criminals: 
Why Does the Ruling Class Punish their Own?
Elena G. Bystrova & Petter Gottschalk
Abstract
Social conﬂict theory suggests that the professional powerful and wealthy represent the elite 
and ruling class in society. The theory holds that laws and law enforcement are used by the 
dominant group to minimize threats to their interests. The justice system is biased and 
designed to protect the ruling class. Sanctioning of laws enables the dominant class to 
pressure a domestic order that allows its interests to be promoted and maintained. This article 
addresses the issue of deviant behavior by members of the ruling class. Speciﬁcally, it 
addresses the issue of law breaking by white-collar criminals. Reasons for law enforcement 
towards members of the elite are discussed in this article, including conﬂict reduction and 
class obedience. A research model is developed for predictors of white-collar crime 
prosecution.
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Introduction
Social conﬂict theory suggests that the powerful and wealthy in the upper class 
of society deﬁne what is right and what is wrong (Petrocelli et al., 2003; Siegel, 
2011). The rich and mighty people can behave like "robber barons" because they 
make the laws and because they control law enforcement (Chamlin, 2009; Kane, 
2003; Haines, 2014; Sutherland, 1940, 1949; Veblen, 1899; Wheelock et al., 2011). 
The ruling class does not consider white-collar offences as regular crime, and 
certainly not similar to street crime (Hagan, 1980; Lanier and Henry, 2009a, 2009b; 
Slyke and Bales, 2013). 
Nevertheless, crime by individuals in the elite tends to be prosecuted if crime is 
detected and evidence of wrongdoing is present (Brightman, 2009; Gottschalk and 
Rundmo, 2014; Seron and Munger, 1996), as long as they are not too powerful 
(Pontell et al., 2014) and do not have too excellent defense attorneys (Gottschalk, 
2014). This article explores reasons why elite crime in terms of white-collar crime is 
prosecuted. Speciﬁcally, this article addresses the following research question: Why 
does the ruling class punish their own? 
Social Conﬂict Theory
Social conﬂict theory views ﬁnancial crime as a function of the conﬂict that 
exists in society (Siegel, 2011). The theory suggests that class conﬂict causes crime 
in any society, and that those in power create laws to protect their rights and 
interests. For example, embezzlement by employees is as a violation of law to 
protect the interests of the employer. However, it might be argued that an employer 
must and should protect own assets. Bank fraud is a crime to protect the powerful 
banking sector. However, in the perspective of conﬂict theory one might argue that a 
bank should have systems making bank fraud impossible. If an employee has no 
opportunity to commit embezzlement, and if a fraudster has no opportunity to 
commit bank fraud, then these kinds of ﬁnancial crime will not occur, and there will 
be no need to have laws against such offenses. Law enforcement protects powerful 
companies against counterfeit products, although they should be able to protect 
themselves by reducing opportunities for the production of counterfeit products.
Social conﬂict theory holds that laws and law enforcement are used by 
dominant groups in society to minimize threats to their interests posed by those 
whom they perceive as dangerous and greedy (Petrocelli et al., 2003). Crime is 
deﬁned by legal codes and sanctioned by institutions of criminal justice to secure 
order in society. The ruling class secures order in the ruled class by means of laws 
and law enforcement. Conﬂicts and clashes between interest groups are restrained 
and stabilized by law enforcement (Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 2014).
According to social conﬂict theory, the justice system is biased and designed to 
protect the wealthy and powerful. The wealthy and powerful can take substantial 
assets out of their own companies at their own discretion whenever they like, 
although employed workers in the companies were the ones who created the values. 
The superrich can exploit their own wealth that they created as owners of 
corporations as long as they do not hurt other shareholders. Employees have no right 
to object. It is no crime to take out values from own enterprises and build private 
mansions for the money. This is no crime by the owners. Even when the owners just 
inherited the wealth created by earlier generations, they can dispose freely of it for 
private consumption. Similarly, top executives who are on each other's corporate 
boards grant each other salaries that are ten or twenty times higher than regular 
employee salaries. As Haines (2014: 21) puts it, “ﬁnancial practices that threaten 
corporate interests, such as embezzlement, are clearly identiﬁed as criminal even as 
obscenely high salaries remain relatively untouched by regulatory controls”. 
Furthermore, sharp practices such as insider trading that threaten conﬁdence in 
equities markets have enjoyed vigorous prosecution, since the powerful see them as 
opaque transactions that give an unfair advantage to those who are not members of 
the market institutions.
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Marxist Criminology
Karl Marx – who analyzed capitalism and suggested the transition to socialism 
and ultimately to communism – created the basis for social conﬂict theory. 
Capitalism is an economic system in which persons privately own trade, industries, 
ﬁrms, shops and means of production and operate these enterprises or proﬁt. 
Socialism is an economic system characterized by cooperative enterprises, common 
ownership, and state ownership. Communism is a socioeconomic system structured 
upon the common ownership of the means of production and characterized by the 
absence of social classes.
 Marxist criminology views the competitive nature of the capitalist system as a 
major cause of ﬁnancial crime (Siegel, 2011). It focuses on what creates stability and 
continuity in society, and it adopts a predeﬁned political philosophy. Marxist 
criminology focuses on why things change by identifying the disruptive forces in 
capitalist societies, and describing how power, wealth, prestige, and perceptions of 
the world divide every society. The economic struggle is the central venue for the 
Marxists. Marx divided society into two unequal classes and demonstrated the 
inequality in the historical transition from patrician and slave to capitalist and 
wageworker. It is the rulers versus the ruled. Marx also underlined that all societies 
have a certain hierarchy wherein the higher class has more privileges than the lower 
one. In a capitalist society where economic resources equate to power, it is in the 
interest of the ascendant class to maintain economic stratiﬁcation in order to dictate 
the legal order (Petrocelli et al., 2003).
When economic resources equate to power, then conﬂict and competition 
between groups will occur for scarce resources such as education, housing and jobs. 
Dominant groups can reduce the threat of other groups in the competition for 
resources through social control and criminal punishment (Wheelock et al., 2011).
In Marxist criminology, capitalism is a criminogenic society, i.e., a society that 
has a tendency to produce criminality. Capitalism is a system of economic 
production in which power is concentrated in the hands of a few, with the majority 
existing in a dependency relationship to the powerful (Lanier and Henry, 2009b: 
259):
This class-based economic order is maintained by a criminal justice 
apparatus that serves the interests of the wealthy at the expense of the 
poor. Those who challenge this system of production are destined for 
social control, especially if they are seen as a serious threat to the system. 
Another German theorist was Max Weber, who wrote about classes in society, 
economic exploitation of people, political repression, and conﬂict within society. 
Neither Marx nor Weber wrote extensively about theories of crime or criminal 
behavior, but their theoretical perspective served as a good basis for conﬂict theory. 
Economic inequalities advance to assume disproportionate power in society and 
lead to social conﬂict.
4Laws and Law Enforcement
Conﬂict theory provides an explanation of crime, since it is concerned with 
social inequality, class and racial differences, and the power used by the ruling class 
through its criminal justice apparatus. Conﬂict theorists see inequality based on 
differences in wealth, status, ideas, and religious beliefs. Not only do capitalist 
societies generate vast inequalities of wealth, but also those who own the wealth, 
who control large corporations and ﬁnancial and commercial institutions, inﬂuence 
those who have political power to get the laws they want (Lanier and Henry, 2009b).
Conﬂict theory is a perspective in criminology that emphasize the social, 
political, or material inequality of a social group (Seron and Munger, 1996), that 
draw attention to power differentials, such as class conﬂict. Crime stems from 
conﬂict between different levels in society fueled by a system of domination based 
on inequality, alienation, and justice. Crime is harm that comes from differences in 
power (Lanier and Henry, 2009a).
Conﬂict is a fundamental social process. Society is largely shaped by the 
competing interests of social groups who struggle for dominance in order to enact or 
maintain a social structure most beneﬁcial to them (Petrocelli et al., 2003: 2)
Conﬂict theory asserts that the relative power of a given social group 
dictates social order in that powerful groups not only control the 
lawmakers, but also the law enforcement apparatus of the state. In 
essence, laws are made which serve the interests of the privileged, and the 
police are used to suppress and control any segment of society that poses a 
threat to the status quo.
According to conﬂict theory, economic inequalities and repression lead to 
deviant behavior. Laws, law breaking, and law enforcement are factors that evolve 
from and contribute to social conﬂicts, and strengthen the dominant position of 
powerful individuals. Laws tend to penalize behavior of certain classes, and not 
individuals, because it is the more powerful classes that are in a position to 
pronounce certain actions as illegal. The ruling class is faced with the decision, 
which values to enforce when making laws. Criminal law plays the role of a social 
control mechanism. Certain types of conduct are prohibited, and certain kinds of 
sanctions are imposed for their infringement. The ruling class in society has the 
power to deﬁne certain behavior as deviant, while the ruled class might be of a 
differing opinion about what is right and what is wrong. Criminal laws are 
established mainly for the protection and development of the institutions of 
capitalism. Through laws, the powerful class exercises its power and controls the 
resources.
An example is alcohol versus drug laws. Alcohol is legal, while drugs are 
illegal in most capitalist societies. Hagan (1980) argues that the reason why the 
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prohibition of narcotics outlasts the prohibition of alcohol is that historically the use 
of different drugs has been associated with minority groups, whereas alcohol has 
been a socially acceptable intoxicant used by members of the middle and upper 
classes. Drug laws are speciﬁcally, if not explicitly, targeted at looser groups in 
society. As a result, alcohol prohibition was eventually repealed, while drug laws are 
still in force.
In addition to laws and law breaking, sanctioning of laws in terms of law 
enforcement is a factor that evolves from and contributes to strengthen the dominant 
position of the ruling class. Even if some of the acts of misconduct and offenses by 
members of the ruling class are determined by law as crime, law enforcement is 
often reluctant to investigate and prosecute the criminals. They may be too powerful 
with friends in key positions (Pontell et al., 2014). Furthermore, the size of the police 
force is typically larger for policing the lower classes. As an example, Norwegian 
police has two national units for investigations of violent crime and ﬁnancial crime 
respectively. While the National Criminal Investigation Service has 700 employees, 
the National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic Crime and 
Environmental Crime has only 140 employees. Thus, combatting ﬁnancial crime 
has only 20 percent of the resources available to combatting street crime. As stated 
by Chamlin (2009: 546), “crime control practices are disproportionately responsive 
to the concerns and fears of the more powerful segments of society.”
Kane (2003) studied the relationship between the size of the police force and 
minority population on the precinct level in New York City. The study shows that the 
police force increased when minority population fractions increased. The study 
supports the minority group-threat hypothesis that the percentage of black and 
Latino populations in US cities can predict variations in municipal police resources. 
Speciﬁcally, the study found that increases in the percentage of Latino populations 
of precincts can predict changes in police deployment, and the link between Latino 
populations and police deployment is nonlinear. This leads to police perception of 
the area as an offense space, and they tend to choose aggressive policing in the area.
Sanctioning of laws enables the dominant economic class to pressure a 
domestic order that allows its interests to be promoted and maintained. Economic 
stratiﬁcation is so important to the ruling class that they will pressure legislators to 
enact repressive measures intended to control groups considered volatile and 
threatening (Petrocelli et al., 2003). Conﬂict theory of crime control contends that 
the political state functions to further the distinctive interests of the most powerful 
segments of society. Within the context of crime control, this means suppressing 
illegal activities of out-group members that particularly endanger social elites or 
violate their behavioral norms (Chamlin, 2009).
6White-Collar Criminals
A white-collar criminal is typically a member of the privileged socioeconomic 
classes in society (Sutherland, 1949) who is involved in illegal activities and 
commits nonviolent acts for ﬁnancial gain (Gottschalk, 2014). The white-collar 
criminal is a person of respectability who commits crime in a professional setting, 
where criminal activities are concealed and disguised in organizational work by 
law-abiding behavior (Pontell et al., 2014). The criminal has power and inﬂuence, 
he forms relationships with other persons or professionals, which protects him from 
developing a criminal identity, and he enjoys trust from others in privileged 
networks (Benson and Simpson, 2015). White-collar crime refers to offenses 
committed in an organization by those who indulge in dishonest activities, either by 
themselves or using agents, for ﬁnancial gain (Schoepfer et al., 2010). 
Law enforcement targeted at white-collar criminals is non-aggressive and 
often discrete not only because of the upper class afﬁliation. Another reason is 
white-collar defendants' ability to recruit top defense lawyers who apply symbolic 
defense in addition to substance defense, as well as information control, in their 
work for white-collar clients (Gottschalk, 2014). It is well known that having a well-
qualiﬁed and possibly famous attorney increases one's chances of a favorable 
outcome in any legal dispute. Some individual white-collar offenders avoid criminal 
prosecution because of the class bias of the courts (Tombs and Whyte, 2003). 
When white-collar criminals appear before their sentencing judges, they can 
correctly claim to be ﬁrst-time offenders. According to Slyke and Bales (2013), 
theory and empirical research often have agreed that white-collar offenders beneﬁt 
from leniency at the sentencing stage of criminal justice system processing. Croall 
(2007) argues that the term “crime” is contentious, as many of the harmful activities 
of businesses or occupational elites are not subject to criminal law and punishment 
but administrative or regulatory law and penalties and sanctions. Therefore, very 
few white-collar criminals seem to be put on trial, and even fewer higher-class 
criminals are sentenced to imprisonment. Another reason for the low prosecution 
and conviction rate for white-collar criminals is the extraordinary broadly and fuzzy 
deﬁned offenses in criminal law for white-collar crime (Hasnas et al., 2010). This is 
in line with social conﬂict theory.
Reason 1
 Reduce Conﬂict
Since white-collar crime is crime by the wealthy and powerful, it seems to 
contradict social conﬂict theory. There are no reasons why the wealthy and 
powerful would like to see laws that turn their own actions to regular criminal 
offences. When Sutherland (1940, 1949) ﬁrst coined the term “white-collar 
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crime”, there were indeed reactions in the audience of upper-class people. They 
asked why one should deﬁne actions by privileged individuals of the inﬂuential 
classes as crime at the level of street crime by ordinary criminals. According to 
Brightman (2009), Sutherland's theory of white-collar crime ﬁrst presented in 
1939 was controversial, particularly since many of the academics in the 
audience perceived themselves to be members of the upper echelon in 
American society. The audience was the American Sociological Association 
where Sutherland gave his address and ﬁrst presented his theory of white-collar 
crime. What Podgor (2007) found to be the most interesting aspect of 
Sutherland's work is that a scholar needed to proclaim that crime of the upper 
socio-economic class is in fact crime that should be prosecuted. It is apparent 
that prior to the coining of the term “white-collar crime”, wealth and power 
allowed many persons to escape criminal liability. 
Veblen's (1899) sociological study of the “leisured classes” and their rapacious 
conspicuous consumption had an inﬂuence on Sutherland's (1940, 1949) 
research. Josephson (1962) who coined the term “robber barons” in the 
1930ties was also an inﬂuential scholar at that time. Therefore, Sutherland's 
work on white-collar crime seems to ﬁt with conﬂict theory, where he might 
have seen a need to reduce the level of conﬂict in society by deﬁning obvious 
unjustiﬁed misconduct by privileged individuals as regular crime. This is in 
line with Arrigo and Bernard (1997), who apply conﬂict theory to explain 
initiatives for more prosecution of white-collar criminals. Seron and Munger 
(1996: 187) quoted that “The plain fact is that in a new stage of capitalism, class 
divides as ruthlessly as it did in the age of the Robber Barons.”
Reason 2
Government Inﬂuence
Another reason for starting to deﬁne capitalists and other persons of 
respectability and high social status as regular criminals when they abuse their 
powers for personal or organizational proﬁt is the need of governments to gain 
some kind of control over the business sector and the market economy. 
Business and professional elites had achieved political inﬂuence beyond what 
most democratic governments found acceptable. Even worse, some enterprises 
were so powerful that they became almost untouchable for government 
interventions. They were “too powerful to fail, (and) too powerful to jail” 
(Pontell et al., 2014).
Criminological attention on the activities of business enterprises and other 
organizations, their creativity and power, remains in a conﬂict with political 
inﬂuence of business executives, capitalists and members of the professional 
elites. Haines (2014: 20) discusses corporate fraud as an example, where she 
argues that:
8Criminalization of corporate fraud deﬂects attention to one of these actors, 
the business and its directors, without clear recognition of the role played 
by government itself.
Haines (2014) argues that governments critically, in close consultation with the 
professions, “enact legal and regulatory reforms that engender conﬁdence in 
both the accuracy of accounts and materiality of money while also further 
institutionalizing their underlying ambiguities”.  Hence, even as governments 
are excited to sanction corporate criminals with more vigor, they are at the same 
time implicated in the creation of corporate criminals. Corporate fraud implies 
that there has been a criminal misrepresentation of a ﬁnancial or business state 
of affairs by one or more individuals for ﬁnancial gain, where banks, 
shareholders and tax authorities are among the victims. Yet, misrepresentation 
is a matter of opinion rather than accuracy. For example, estimating values of 
products in stock is no exact science. If nobody wants to buy products in stock, 
they have no value. While governments work at arm's length through external 
auditors, law enforcement is reluctant to prosecute unless misrepresentation of 
the value of a business is completely out of range.
Reason 3
“Our” Laws
A third reason for the prosecution of the wealthy and powerful is that their own 
laws did not intend to target members of their own class. The lawmakers had 
others in society in mind. When caught by surprise that members of their own 
class violate their own laws leads the ruling class to turn laws against their own 
allies. When those allies demonstrate non-conforming and deviant behavior, 
others in the ruling class take on the task of prosecuting deviating members of 
the elite. "As we are reminded today, those who make the laws don't have the 
right to break the laws", Richard Frankel, the specialist agent in charge of the 
Criminal Division of the New York ofﬁce of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, said at a news conference. 
FBI held its news conference as Sheldon Silver, the speaker of the State 
Assembly in New York, faced prosecuted for corruption. State prosecutors 
charged Silver with having exploited his position as one of the most powerful 
politicians in the state of New York to obtain millions of dollars in bribes and 
kickbacks. Prosecutors accused Silver's law practice of being a ﬁction where 
the sources of large payments of bribes were hiding (Rashbaum and Kaplan, 
2015: A24). Silver was arrested on Manhattan on a ﬁve-count indictment in 
January 2015. US attorney Preet Bharara alleged that the Manhattan democrat 
used New York's ethics laws to hide his scheme – allowing him to become 
wealthy off his position in power (Spector, 2015).
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Silver resigned a few weeks later as speaker (McKinley, 2015). At the same 
time, Malcolm A. Smith, a former majority leader of the New York State Senate, was 
convicted of federal corruption charges including bribery, wire fraud and extortion 
(Vega, 2015).
Reason 4
Deviant Behavior
A fourth reason might be disappointment within the ruling class. The ruling 
class in society face decisions over which values to enforce. When individuals 
in their own upper-level class violate some of these values, then the majority 
deﬁnes it as a crime. Those who violate values of fair competition among 
capitalists and market access, for example, are potential criminals, even if they 
belong to the same class as those condemning them.
President George W. Bush's connections to Enron and CEO Kenneth Lay were 
well documented in major American newspapers. However, when Enron 
emerged as a deviant organization with a bad apple CEO, Lay and other top 
executives were prosecuted. Lay died of a heart attack before his conviction 
(Bendiktsson, 2010).
Reason 5
Crime Victims
A ﬁfth reason might be the victim of crime. If the victim of white-collar crime 
were another person in the upper class, then the ruling class would like to 
protect that person. Victimization of upper-class members by other upper-class 
members can be considered a crime. Upper-class members need protection 
against deviant individuals in their own class. It is an inter-group conﬂict in the 
dominant class (Wheelock et al., 2011). Maybe Madoff can serve as an 
example. Rich Jews placed their money in Madoff's investment fund with the 
promise and expectation that the rate of return would be extraordinary good. 
Instead, they lost their money. Wealthy people were victims of Madoff's Ponzi 
scheme. The government had to sanction such behavior by Madoff, and he 
received a record prison sentence of 150 years (Ragothaman, 2014).
In a study of convicted white-collar criminals in Norway, the distribution of 
victims was as follows (Gottschalk, 2013): (1) employers, (2) banks, (3) tax 
authorities, (4) customers, (5) shareholders, and (6) others. Employers belong 
to the elite themselves, while banks and tax authorities are powerful 
institutions in societies. Customers may be weak victims, while shareholders 
who become victims of insider trading, can be a quite powerful group in 
collaboration with the stock exchange.
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Theoretical Model
Our discussion of several reasons why the ruling class punish their own can be 
framed into a theoretical model as illustrated in ﬁgure 1. The dependent variable is 
the likelihood of white-collar crime prosecution which can be deﬁned at both a 
national jurisdiction level and an individual person level. Here it is at the national 
jurisdiction level in society. The likelihood of white-collar crime prosecution 
increases in society according to the following propositions.
Proposition 1: 
Growing social conﬂict from ﬁnancial crime by upper socio-economic class 
members increases the likelihood of white-collar crime prosecution.
Proposition 2: 
Deteriorating government inﬂuence and control over the business sector 
increases the likelihood of white-collar crime prosecution.
Proposition 3: 
Lacking conformity to laws by the ruling class among upper socio-economic 
class member increases the likelihood of white-collar crime prosecution.
Proposition 4: 
Deviating behavior from ruling class values among upper socio-economic 
class members increases the likelihood of white-collar crime prosecution.
Likelihood of white-collar crime 
prosecution in society
Extent of social conﬂict from white-collar 
crime
Lack of government inﬂuence in the
business sector
Degree of non-conformity to core criminal 
laws in crime
Magnitude of deviant behavior from core 
values in crime
Loss suffered by the ruling class from 
white-collar crime
Figure 1. Research Model for Predictors of White-collar Crime Prosecution from 
Social Conﬂict Theory.
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Proposition 5: 
Victimization of ruling class members and their interests by white-collar 
criminals increases the likelihood of white-collar crime prosecution.
Both propositions 3 and 4 are concerned with class obedience in terms of upper-
class expectations to their own members. 
In addition to these ﬁve reasons derived from social conﬂict theory, there are a 
number of other factors inﬂuencing the likelihood of white-collar crime prosecution 
in society. For example, the extent of laws and law enforcement are of importance.
Discussion
Conﬂict theory is an interesting approach to our understanding why most still 
do not consider white-collar crime as a regular kind of crime similar to street crime. 
In terms of neutralization theory (Bock and Kenhove, 2011), it is possible to explain 
the lack of guilt feeling among many convicted white-collar criminals with their 
perception of not having done anything wrong (claim to entitlement) and with their 
perception that laws are wrong (legal mistake).
Reiman (2007: 112) argues that the criminal justice system functions from start 
to ﬁnish in a way that makes certain that the offender at the end of the road in prison 
is likely to be a member of the lowest social and economic groups in society:
For the same criminal behavior, the poor are more likely to be arrested; if 
arrested, they are more likely to be charged; if charged, more likely to be 
convicted; if convicted, more likely to be sentenced to prison; and if 
sentenced, more likely to be given longer prison terms than members of 
the middle or upper classes.
Based on conﬂict theory, there is no reason why members of the elite should 
arrest, charge, convict, and sentence themselves. In fact, behavioral economics 
dating back to Adam Smith's book «The Theory of Moral Sentiments» can explain 
why it instinctively is relevant to express sympathy with white-collar criminals, 
which again is reﬂect in laws and statutes. As Ashraf et al. (2005: 141) express it, we 
humans tend not to have sympathy with poor people, but rather with rich people, i.e. 
that  «contrary to the sensible notion that one should sympathize with those less 
fortunate than oneself, Smith argued that there is a natural tendency to experience 
sympathy for the great and rich». Smith explained in 1759 human sympathy for rich 
people in misconduct in the following way: “What pity we think, that anything 
should spoil and corrupt so agreeable a situation». That is, we have sympathy with 
and feel pity for white-collar individuals who are “victims” of their own crime. 
Instinctive irrationalities can give extreme consequences in terms of who we accept 
and respect, and those we despise and dislike despise – despite identical actions by 
both groups of people.
Conclusion
In this article, the following research question was phrased: Why should the 
powerful punish their own? 
Five answers have emerged: 
i). reduce the level of conﬂict between rich and poor in society;   
ii).  increase government control over the business sector; 
iii).  avoid those making the laws breaking the laws; 
iv).  punish those who do not behave according to elite values, and 
v).  punish those upper-class members that victimize other upper-class 
members.
This article has demonstrated that social conﬂict theory can provide valuable 
explanations of how white-collar crime is perceived and treated in society. While the 
theory implies an initial reluctance to prosecute white-collar criminals, there are 
reasons found in certain circumstances that make prosecution desirable by the ruling 
class.
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